For-Profit Managers as Public Fiduciaries: A Neo-Classical Republican Perspective by Atkinson, Rob




For-Profit Managers as Public Fiduciaries: A Neo-Classical 
Republican Perspective 
Rob Atkinson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Property Law and Real 
Estate Commons 
FOR-PROFIT MANAGERS AS PUBLIC FIDUCIARIES:
A NEO-CLASSI CAL REPUBLICAN PERSPECTIVE*
ROB ATKINSON**
The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits.
-Milton Friedman'
The enjoyment of property and the direction of
industry are considered, in short, to require no social
justification, because they are regarded as rights
which stand by their own virtue, not functions to be




All I have is grace to use it so,




This Article examines the fiduciary duties of for-profit
managers in modern liberal society. To arrive at the right "mix" of
these duties, it compares the fiduciary duties implied by a
standard descriptive model of our society with two competing
normative models: Lockean libertarianism on the "right" and neo-
* This Article was prepared for the symposium Fiduciaries and Trust: Ethics,
Politics, Economics and Law held at the University of Melbourne Law School on December
16, 2018; a substantially shorter version appears under the same title as chapter 13 in the
published proceedings of that symposium, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS,
ECONOMICS AND LAW (Paul B. Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020). I cannot thank my
friend Matthew Harding enough for inviting me to participate in the symposium and for
working out this publication arrangement. My special thanks, too, to Kacey Heekin, Young
Kang, and Joseph McGehee for their excellent research assistance.
** Greenspan Marder Professor of Law, Florida State University.
1. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32 (quoting title).
2. R. H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 24 (1920).
3. JOHN MILTON, On His Being Arrived to the Age of 23, in POEMS UPON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS, ENGLISH, ITALIAN, LATIN TRANSLATIONS 338, 339 (Thomas Warton ed., 1785).
FSU BUSINESS REVIEW
classical republicanism on the "left." This comparison shows that
all three versions of liberalism, even the one with a Lockean night-
watchman state, require far more extensive duties than we now
expect, including a professionalization of management itself. And
it shows that the version of liberalism with the most expansive
state, neo-classical republicanism, requires the most appealing set
of for-profit fiduciary duties. More basically, it concludes that what
makes this latter set most appealing is that we ourselves are
evaluating it from the perspective it recommends for for-profit
managers: what is best, by our own best lights, for society as a
whole.
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INTRODUCTION: ON BEES AND HIVES
(AND BEE-KEEPERS AND HIVE-BUILDERS)
As my three epigraphs suggest, the possible duties of for-profit
managers range across a very wide spectrum. The minimalist
position, at the right pole of the spectrum, has for-profit managers
focus solely on owners' profits. The mediating position insists that
for-profit managers see not only profit-making but also private
ownership itself as serving public functions to which both owners
and managers should properly subordinate their pursuit of profit.
The maximalist position, the "neo-classical republicanism" of my
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title, has managers see both property and profit as serving the
most expansive possible vision of the common good, the
advancement of which is the proper task of owners as well as
managers.
This Article suggests that we, as students of fiduciary duty, see
this last view of managerial duties as also the best. More precisely,
this Article suggests not merely that we should see the last as the
best but also that we actually do see it that way already. This
follows from our own function and the perspective from which we
perform our function.
Our analysis of for-profit managers' fiduciary duties will
require three basic steps. Part I, Analyzing the Analysis: How
Functionalist Analysis Functions, defines the task. With
functionalists before Plato and past R. H. Tawney4 we operate on
the sensible premise that form follows function. If we are to know
how something works best, we must first understand what it
works for. So, if we are to find the proper range of managers'
duties, we must, accordingly, determine the proper function of
managers themselves. The duties of for-profit managers keep them
to their proper task.
But that basic functionalist point presses us to broaden our
inquiry further still. To appreciate something's purpose, be it a
task or a tool, we must see it as part of a larger system. A glass
beverage bottle, found by Neolithic folk, would be a great mystery,
perhaps even a grave danger.5 And so it may prove to be with for-
profit enterprise, isolated from the broader society it serves.
Traditional warnings about the single-minded pursuit of profit6
prove, under modern analysis, profoundly prescient, if a bit over-
protective. It may well be possible to serve two masters, private
profit and the common good, but striking the proper balance may
require managers to keep an eye on more than the bottom line.
Our seminar's subtitle gives us the proper context for our
particular analysis. Its four headings-Ethics, Politics, Economics,
4. See TAWNEY, supra note 2, at 84 ("The essential thing is that men should fix their
minds upon the idea of purpose, and give that idea pre-eminence over all subsidiary
issues.").
5. This, you may well remember, is the premise of the comedic film THE GODS MUST
BE CRAZY (C.A.T. Films 1980), in which a Coca-Cola bottle carelessly tossed from a jet
airliner landed among the indigenous folk of the Kalahari.
6. Matthew 6:24 (King James) ("No man can serve two masters: for either he will
hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye
cannot serve God and mammon.").
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and Law-provide the appropriately broad frame within which to
analyze our particular subject.
Part II is The Analysis Proper: The Fiduciary Duties of For-
Profit Managers. It examines the range of for-profit managerial
duties implied by our three ideal-type liberal societies. Very
generally stated, this is what I think we will find. On the one
hand, each of our three ideal societies requires a much broader set
of managerial duties than those that managers are now generally
thought to owe investors. This is because each regime requires a
basic commitment to the common good, not just to the private good
of owners. On the other hand, the scope of the common good differs
in each of the regimes. This difference, in turn, means that
managers' duties will differ across regimes, both in terms of what
the duties are and in terms of how-to whom and from whom-
they run. Our analysis starts with the regime with the least
extensive set of fiduciary duties and moves to the regime with the
most; as we find deficiencies in one, we seek to address them in the
next. This process will lead us, ultimately, to the set of fiduciary
duties implied by neo-classical republicanism.
7
7. The modifier "neo-classical" is important; it distinguishes the version of
republicanism applied here to business managers from the version of republicanism applied
to fiduciary duties more generally in Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican
Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEx. L. REV. 993 passim (2017). Criddle's republicanism builds
on the work of Phillip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and others, which focuses on liberty as "non-
domination" by power-holders in both public and private law. See id. at 1001-06; see also
Samantha Besson & Jos6 Luis Marti, Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues, in
LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 13 (Samantha
Besson & Jos6 Luis Marti eds., 2009) ("The most popular formulation of republican liberty is
Pettit's 'freedom as non-domination.' "); C6cile Laborde & John Maynor, The Republican
Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY
1, 2 (C6cile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008) ("Pettit's ideal of non-domination is (which
the historian Quentin Skinner prefers to call independence) is central to contemporary
republicanism."). The architects of this version of republicanism are careful to distinguish it
from classical republicanism with modifiers like "modern" or "inclusive" or "civic." See
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 95-96 (1997)
(discussing "modern or inclusive brand' as opposed to "traditional"). Republicans of the
modern school reject, more or less explicitly, as a form of domination what I take to be the
essence of classical republicanism, the notion that any meaningful approximation of
individual justice as self-realization will entail the political rule of the wise for the good of
all. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC passim (A. D. Lindsay trans., Everyman's Library 1992). That
is the fundamental sense in which my republicanism is "classical" and theirs is not. To be
sure, I join them in rejecting certain aspects of classical republicanism: militarism,
patriarchy, and exclusivism. See Rob Atkinson, Reviving the Roman Republic; Remembering
the Good Old Cause, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1199-1205 (2003). But I see these
objectionable elements as adventitious, not essential. Id. In terms of Isaiah Berlin's classic
distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberty, which itself traces back to Constant's
distinction between "the liberty of moderns" and "the liberty of the ancients," their summum
bonum of non-domination is a form of negative liberty, my summum bonum of self-
realization is a form of positive liberty. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY passim
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Explaining why that process leads us there is the task of Part
III, The Meta-Analysis: Fiduciaries of Fiduciary Duty. Here we
must step back from our functional analysis of the fiduciary duties
of for-profit managers to examine our own function in that
analysis. The very way in which we set these standards in our
system, and the way we ourselves have reviewed them together,
show us that our own system and our function in it embody the
most basic principal of neo-classical republicanism already:
seeking the common good, with the help of those who know where
to find it, and how. That, we will see, is who we are and what we
are doing.
These findings, I'm afraid, will come both as a bit of a surprise
and a bit of an embarrassment. The surprise will be that our
modern liberal society, once we recognize the fuller range of
managerial duties that it implies, is already better than we let
ourselves believe it could be. The embarrassment will be that we
will see ourselves as very much a part of what makes our society
as good as it is. We are the fiduciaries of fiduciary duty, because
the eye of Milton's "great Taskmaster" is ours, even as it was his
(although, we will have to admit, not necessarily his, much less
ours, alone). This embarrassment, in turn, will make for a final
surprise, and another embarrassment: our society would be a great
deal better still if we could get past our misplaced modesty. We
could, I believe, make global capitalism great again. That, indeed,
is our fiduciary duty, as academic students of the fiduciary duties
of for-profit managers in a modern liberal society.
(1958). Compare Criddle, supra, at 1002 ("The state fulfills its mission to secure liberty
when it enacts and enforces laws that protect its people from 'domination.' "), with Rob
Atkinson, The Future of Philanthropy: Questioning Today's Orthodoxies, Re-Affirming
Yesterday's Foundations, 4 WM. & MARY P(L. REV. 251, 265 (2013) (identifying the twin
goals of a neo-classical republic as "provid[ing] the needy with the means to flourish and
promot[ing] the highest forms of human flourishing"). In that sense, my neo-classical
republicanism is less like "modern" republicanism and more like Joseph Raz's "positive"
liberalism. See MATTHEW HARDING, CHARITY LAW AND THE LIBERAL STATE 61 & n.65
(Cambridge University Press 2014) (citing Rob Atkinson, Re-Focusing on Philanthropy:
Revising and Re-Orienting the Standard Model, 4 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 1, 2 (2012))
(noting that my neo-classical republican theory of philanthropy identifies its distinctive
function as "generat[ing] the cultural public goods on which the conditions of autonomy
depend').
For present purposes, the importance of these distinctions is this: From "modern"
republicanism, Criddle derives a much narrower set of fiduciary duties than the set I derive
from my neo-classical republicanism. I note these differences as they occur, below. I do not
explicitly argue that modern republican theory could itself support a broader set of fiduciary
duties (although I rather suspect hat it could).
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I. ANALYZING THE ANALYSIS: How FUNCTIONALIST
ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS
Before we can properly begin our functional analysis of the
fiduciary duties of for-profit managers, we must first step back and
look, more broadly, at functionalist analysis itself. From that
perspective, we need to see that it has two related aspects, one
descriptive, the other normative. As in functional analysis itself,
the descriptive logically precedes the normative.
A. The Preliminary Descriptive Task: How to Locate
What We're Looking for
Our descriptive task is to identify the full range of for-profit
managers' possible fiduciary duties, then to narrow that range
down to the sets of duties implied by three ideal-type liberal
societies: a libertarian night-watchman state, a standard model of
modern liberal democracy, and a neo-classical republic.
1. The Three-Sector Sphere of Liberal Society
Modern liberal societies, as they exist and as they are modeled,
have three public sectors: the economic, the legal, and the cultural.
Economics and Law, the two of our subheadings that point to our
descriptive task, identify two of our society's three basic public
sectors: the economic and the legal. In the background, and
properly so, is our society's third public sector, the cultural.8 This
analysis, like our project generally, foregrounds the economic and
legal sectors; it will nonetheless be helpful to recall the cultural
sector and to refer to it at several critical points. As Figure 1 on
the following page suggests, these three sectors, though
analytically distinct, are functionally interpenetrating and
inseparable. Each shapes, and is shaped by, the other two.
8. Scholars frequently, and rightly, identify a fourth sector of our society, the
household. See Rob Atkinson, Philanthropy's Function: A Neoclassical Reconsideration, in
NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15, 23-27 (Matthew
Harding et al. eds., 2014). To do more than acknowledge that fourth sector here would
unduly complicate our analysis.
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Figure 1. Three Public Sectors of Liberal Society.
As we have said, the fiduciary duties of for-profit managers
imply for-profit enterprises; for-profit enterprises, in turn, imply
some form of capitalist market economy. Capitalist markets, in
turn, imply a certain level of legal infrastructure, including a basic
recognition of transferable private property rights. And both the
economic system in which for-profits operate and the legal system
that sustains that economy operate against the background of a
cultural sector in which these economic and legal arrangements
are, at a minimum, acceptable.
As a legal academic, I'm torn between placing the cultural
sector and the legal sector on the bottom of Figure 1, as the most
basic sector. A Marxist, of course, would rotate the sphere to show
that my two favorites are but "epiphenomena" of the truly
fundamental economic sector.
The Marxist and I would agree, however, on one point critical
to our analysis: Our current society is liberal, and that liberalism
is reflected in the basic structure and function of each of its
sectors. Our society has a capitalist market economy, a liberal
democratic legal system, and a voluntary and pluralistic culture.
Whatever "liberal" may properly mean, it refers here, for purposes
of setting the "parameters" for our analysis, to a society with its
three public sectors organized in these ways. Our three ideal-type
regimes are all liberal possibilities within those three parameters.
[Vol. 19
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2. The Matrix of Possible Managerial Duties: From Friedman's
One Toward Milton's All
From this broadest background, we need next to focus in on the
range of relationships in which business managers are embedded.
Traditional legal analysis, like Milton Friedman's famous
editorial,9 tends to focus on the relationship between for-profit
managers and the owners of for-profit firms.10 But that is barely
the beginning of the analytic possibilities, because the relationship
between entrepreneur and manager is only one of a very much
wider set of relationships essential to every for-profit enterprise.
Figure 2 below indicates some, but by no means all, of these
additional relationships:
Figure 2. Matrix of
Entrep
9. Friedman, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006);
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (AM. L.
INST. 1994). So, too, does modern republican analysis. See Criddle, supra note 7, at 1000
("The republican theory also clarifies fiduciary law's proper scope, explaining why some
interpersonal relationships that pose a risk of harmful opportunism qualify as fiduciary
relationships (e.g., trustee-beneficiary), while others do not (e.g., manufacturer-
consumer)."). Cf. Martin Gelter & Genevi6ve Helleringer, Constituency Directors and
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 302 passim
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (noting that, in many civil law European
countries, the fiduciary duties of managers extent to a range of "stakeholders" considerably
more inclusive than those holding "equity" or "ownership" interests in the corporation).
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Across the top of Figure 2, on the "X-axis," runs a range of
those involved in business transactions to whom fiduciary duties
might be owed. They are possible "principals." Down the left-hand
side of Figure 2, on the "Y-axis," runs a range of those involved in
business transactions by whom fiduciary duties might be owed.
They are possible "agents." This rightly reflects that the
relationships between those listed across the top and those listed
down the side are necessarily reciprocal: Those down the side
might "owe duties" to those across the top; those across the top
might "hold entitlements" against those down the side.11
3. The Three Dimensions of Each Fiduciary Duty
For the matrix in Figure 2 to do all the work we need it to, it
must do more than merely indicate where we might locate
fiduciary duties, the "boxes" we think should be "ticked" to indicate
that a particular relationship requires a fiduciary duty in order to
function properly. Beyond that, Figure 2 must also indicate what
the "shape" of each duty should be. The duty we "draw" in any
particular "box" would have three "dimensions." Corresponding to
"height," we would indicate, along the left "side" of each box, how
much of the agent's "self' should be involved in the duty. The
range of the agent's involvement would run from a minimum of
something like "Its just a summer job, Man..." to a maximum of
something like "Its my whole life, Mama (or Love, or God)!'
12
Corresponding to "width," we would indicate, along the "bottom" of
each box, how much of the principal's interests we want the agent
to take into account.1 3 The range of the principal's interests that
should concern the agent would run from a minimum of something
like "The kid's only eating an ice cream cone" to a maximum of
something like "The child's life depends on this prosthetic!'
1 4
11. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
12. This latter prospect implies the possibility of a much "higher" commitment on the
part of the agent than does Criddle's "modern" republican theory of fiduciary duty. See
Criddle, supra note 7, passim. As we shall see, in neo-classical republican theory this will
entail a level of commitment that requires at least some business managers to be
functionalist professionals.
13. See Irit Samet, Fiduciary Duty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 125, 126-30 (describing how the duty of
loyalty can be understood as "thick" or "thin").
14. Criddle's modern republican theory, by contrast, would seem to exclude
purchasers from the focus of business managers' fiduciary duty altogether. See Criddle,
supra note 7, at 1000 (citing "manufacturer-consumer" as an interpersonal relationship that
'pose[s] a risk of harmful opportunism" without qualifying as a fiduciary relationship).
[Vol. 19
FOR-PROFIT MANAGERS
The necessary third dimension of our analysis, representing
the "depth" of each fiduciary duty, is a bit trickier, both graphically
and conceptually. With a little help from classical perspective
drawing, we must turn our "box" into a "cube."15 "Depth" would
reflect how aggressively we want to enforce the duty, and by what
means. The depth of a duty might range from "soft" and informal
social sanctions like managers' loss of self-respect and the regard
of their manager's peers in the cultural sector, through loss of
productivity bonuses or profit-shares in the economic sector, to
imposition of "hard" and formal penalties in the legal sector,
themselves ranging from corrective fines to punitive
imprisonment. 16
If we thought that a particular relation of possible principal
and possible agent in our "Matrix of Business Relationships"
should be guarded by a fiduciary duty, we would then turn the
"box" at that particular intersection into a "cube." A typical "cube"
would look like Figure 3 below.





15. Anyone who has ever read even a few children's books would realize that a "pop-
up" feature would be hugely helpful here.
16. Here, yet again, my neo-classical republican theory calls for a larger fiduciary
duty than Criddle's modern republicanism. My theory would include the full range of legal
and quasi-legal enforcement mechanisms; Criddle focuses primarily on the traditional range
of duties available to redress breaches of fiduciary duties. See Criddle, supra note 7, at 998
(arguing that modern republican theory better accounts for two basic aspects of traditional
fiduciary law than does alternative liberal theory); see also Andrew S. Gold & Paul B.
Miller, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at
1, 1 ("Compliance with these duties ... is unusually demanding [and t]he remedial response
to the wrongful violation of fiduciary duties is also notoriously harsh.").
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Once we expand our "Matrix of Business Relationships" from
Figure 2 to include Fiduciary Duty "Cubes," we can see the scope of
our work: deciding which relationships should be protected by
fiduciary duties, and what the "shape" of those duties should be.
Fully forty-nine fiduciary duties are logically possible, each to be
shaped in three related directions.
If you're wondering, Is all this really necessary (damn it!)?,
then we are on the same page, figuratively as well as literally.
17
You have seen, I am confident, what a devil of a lot of detail a full
analysis of even the most basic business relationships would
necessarily entail. You have also seen, I am equally confident, that
we cannot hope, within the limits of our time (not to mention
inclination), to complete anything approaching so full an analysis.
You will thus be receptive, I trust, to suggestions for legitimately
limiting our task. I have three.
The most obvious, and obviously legitimate, limit lies in our
topic itself. Since our topic is the fiduciary duties of for-profit
managers, we must, perforce, focus on duties running from them to
the other relevant "stake-holders." We need consider the duties
that other "stake-holders" themselves might owe only as those
duties shed light upon our focal duties-again, those owed by for-
profit managers.
And, even with respect to managers, we must limit ourselves to
a simplified picture, our second legitimate limitation: We must
focus only on "higher" management, and we must generally
assume that ownership is unified in one person, not divided among
an ever-ramified range of individual stock-holders and
institutional investors. This is, of course, a radically simplifying
set of assumptions. But it is neither unrealistic nor unhelpful:
Many of today's most significant firms are structured pretty nearly
as simply as that; that is, essentially, the shape of every successful
high-tech firm up to the time of its initial public offering. And
those high-tech firms pose some of the most salient examples of
why the fiduciary duties of managers need to be both re-examined
and expanded.
The third simplifying limit I have to suggest is, admittedly, a
little counterintuitive: If we are to make our analysis of for-profit
fiduciary duties not only possible but also most useful, we must
add another level. Before we can determine what the proper scope
17. And it is worth noting, misery loving company, that we are not alone. See TAMAR




of any particular fiduciary duty should be, we must notice that any
answer will depend, in all cases, on a prior question: In what kind
of liberal regime will this duty be functioning?
18
This question is profoundly important, both practically and
theoretically. As a practical matter, the long-running debate about
the proper scope of business managers' duties has always been
part of a larger debate about what kind of liberal society we should
have. As a theoretical matter, we cannot assess the appropriate
scope of fiduciary duties without tracing those differences back to
their source, the different visions of liberalism from which they
derive. In order to decide what the proper scope of for-profit
fiduciary duties is, we must first evaluate them against the
background of the regimes in which they function.
This means that, for both practical and theoretical reasons, we
must assess fiduciary duties "wholesale," as part of a larger
"package," before we can assess them "retail," possible duty by
possible duty, dimension by dimension. This, in turn, points us
both back to our three epigraphs and forward to the second,
normative, half of our task. Our three epigraphs, we can now
appreciate, point us to three different "packages" of fiduciary
duties, each representing a theoretically and practically important
point on a scale of possibilities running from most to least
demanding of managers in all three dimensions. On the far right,
we have Lockean libertarianism, with the smallest package of
fiduciary duties; in the middle, we have the package that goes with
modern liberal societies;19 and on the far left we have neo-classical
republicanism, with the biggest possible package of fiduciary
duties. Across the entire range of duties that for-profit managers
might owe, we need to focus on just these three sets.
Having found those competing packages of fiduciary duties of
for-profit managers, how are we to assess them? Here our
functionalist analysis turns from its descriptive to its normative
mode.
B. The Preliminary Normative Task: How to Evaluate
What We Find
Functionalism's normative mode has two related foci, the
macrocosmic and the microcosmic. We have just seen that two
18. See id. at xiii ("Like all laws, fiduciary law is shaped by the society which it
governs-by the pressures society exerts on its members outside the law, and the values
society's members feel constrained to follow.").
19. See id. at xv ("Fiduciary law rules should be examined, explained, and evaluated
in light of America's social pressures and values.").
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headings of our symposium's subtitle, Economics and Law, let us
both situate and focus the first, descriptive part of our task:
finding our three sets of fiduciary duties for for-profit managers.
Now we need to see that the other two headings, Ethics and
Politics, define the second, normative, part of that task: deciding
which of those sets of fiduciary duties is, in the appropriate sense,
best. Politics is the macroscopic focus; it looks at the good of the
social system as a whole, functioning well in all its parts: the
economic, the legal, and the cultural. Ethics is the microscopic
focus; it looks at the good of the individual within the system,
situated simultaneously in each of the system's three public
sectors. Our political analysis will focus on the role that each
version of liberalism assigns the for-profit manager; our ethical
analysis will focus on what kind of person each version of
liberalism expects a manager to be.
With these two foci, Ethics and Politics, in mind, we must look
at each of our three liberal societies from two different
perspectives, one "inside" and the other "outside."20 From the
"inside" perspective, we see the set of fiduciary duties that is right
for each regime, what set of fiduciary duties is "best" where "best"
means most suited to advancing the values of that regime. This
first, "inside" analysis is necessarily long but mercifully
straightforward. It is long because it requires us to spell out in
some detail the functions that the particular goals of each regime
assign its for-profit managers. But it is straightforward because,
once we discover what these requirements in a particular regime
are, we know what is "right" for for-profit managers in that
regime. It is, again, the "form" of fiduciary duties suited to their
"function." And it is, you will recognize, a kind of hypothetical
imperative: If you want to your managers to suitably serve this
form of liberal society, this is the set of fiduciary duties they must
operate under. If you want to run a regime like ours, or a regime of
Lockean or neo-classical republicanism, this is what you will have
your for-profit managers do, and this is how they should do it.
That brings us to our second, "outside" perspective. If analysis
from the "inside" perspective is necessarily long but mercifully
straightforward, analysis from the "outside" perspective can be
ruthlessly short but must be profoundly fraught. From the
"outside" perspective we must decide which of our three liberal
20. This distinction is, of course, a familiar one in both social science and
jurisprudence. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM passim (1951); H. L. A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-74 (2d ed. 1994).
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regimes, including its best-suited set of fiduciary duties, best
advances the values that we, as its evaluators, want to advance.
Here, however, we notice an odd parallel with our "inside"
analysis. As our "inside" analysis of each regime will have a
common structure, so, too, our movement from each regime to the
next will have a common dynamic. Unsatisfactory aspects of each
regime and its suitable set of fiduciary duties will press us toward
the next regime and set of duties. We will trace our dissatisfaction
to three related sources: the particular array of managerial duties
that the regime produces, the particular ordering of social
purposes that this array is meant to serve, and the theoretical
underpinnings on which these social purposes themselves
ultimately rest.
Once we reach the final regime, the neo-classically republican,
we will find, not that we are affirmatively deciding in its favor but
that it is the only alternative left. But, paradoxically, that regime
will not win by mere default. It will, rather, be the regime that we
ourselves have made, based on the values that we bring with us to
any functional analysis. As we will see, it is the regime where for-
profit managers are required to be what we ourselves are: trustees
of the common good.
C. Summary
Our analytic task, we have seen, has two complementary
components, the descriptive and the normative. On the descriptive
side, we have narrowed our search down through three distinct
levels-liberal society as a whole, the range of possible business-
related fiduciary duties within liberal societies, and three ideal-
type liberal societies. On the normative side, we have identified
two perspectives from which to evaluate the three "packages" of
fiduciary duties we identify, one from "inside" each ideal-type
society and the other from "outside."
In thus setting up our inquiry, we have been in two double
binds. To make our proper analysis manageably short, our
preliminary analysis had to be tryingly long. And, to keep it from
being longer still, it has had to be all too abstract. If there is a way
out of these binds, it has to be in the analysis proper: it will flesh
out the very dry bones of this preliminary analysis, even as this
preliminary analysis will keep it lean and clean. And it will tell us,
within the space we have, what we really need to know: not only
what the proper fiduciary duties of managers are but also about
how we should best go about setting them.
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II. THE ANALYSIS PROPER: THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
FOR-PROFIT MANAGERS
This Part outlines the fiduciary duties of for-profit managers
under three ideal-type liberal societies: Lockean libertarianism,
modern "Western" societies, and neo-classical republicanism. The
point of the comparison, again, is to guide our assessment of for-
profit managers' duties in the intermediate category, the
predominant society today. Our analysis moves from the regime
that entails the fewest and thinnest managerial duties to the
regime that entails the most and the thickest, from the libertarian
state, through the modern liberal state, to the neo-classical
republic.
A. Lockean Libertarian Society: What's Good for the Bee Is Good
for the Hive (and "Good" Is Either God's Will or
a Quasi-Newtonian Normative Gravity)
Our epigraph from R. H. Tawney nicely captures the Lockean
notion of private property and private economic enterprise:
The enjoyment of property and the direction of
industry are considered, in short, to require no social
justification, because they are regarded as rights
which stand by their own virtue, not functions to be
judged by the success with which they contribute to
a social purpose.
21
I follow Tawney's lead in beginning with the Lockean version of
liberalism for essentially the reasons Tawney himself gave: "To-
day that doctrine, if intellectually discredited, is still the practical
foundation of social organization."22 If anything, the case for
starting with Locke is stronger in our time and place than in his.
23
21. TAWNEY, supra note 2, at 24. Tawney does not explicitly mention Locke, and the
libertarian theory of property that Tawney outlines could, quite conceivably, have non-
Lockean foundations. Indeed, as Tawney points out, it very much needs them. It is this
reference to shaky foundations of the popular understanding of libertarian property that
makes me sure he's alluding to Locke.
22. Id. at 24-25.
23. In the English-speaking world beyond the British Isles, particularly in the United
States, Lockean notions of property and politics are even more thoroughly rooted in the
popular notions of proper social order. See LouIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA 9-11 (1955) ("There has never been a 'liberal movement' or a real 'liberal party' in
America: we have only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke
which usually does not know that Locke himself is involved."); see also P. S. ATIYAH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 47 (1979) ("But what was prescriptive in England
became descriptive in the United States, where the Federal Constitution embodies Locke's
ideas concerning the relationship of Government to property."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
[Vol. 19
FOR-PROFIT MANAGERS
Locke's interlocking theories of property and politics, already
intellectually dubious in Tawney's time, have enjoyed a robust
revival in our own.24 Given the continuing appeal of Locke's model
(or, perhaps more precisely, the continuing appeals to Locke's
model), we need to see that this model itself implies a wider and
more robust range of managerial duties than is generally
recognized.
We look, first, at the appeal of Locke's ethics and politics to
those who take the narrowest possible view of managers' fiduciary
duties. We then notice that Locke's ethics and politics imply a
more robust set of managerial duties than they, or we, tend to
recognize. Even so, we note, finally, that the fiduciary duties
extrapolated from Locke's theory may well not satisfy us and that
Locke's foundations of his ethics and politics give us ample
warrant to look elsewhere.
1. The Foundations of Locke's Liberal Politics
In our time as in Tawney's, efforts to expand private property
rights to their maximum and to reduce conceptions of the common
good to its minimum tend naturally to settle on something like
Lockean foundations.25 As Tawney suggests, this is because
Locke's system shifts the burden of proof on two critical questions
so radically as to essentially beg those questions: What are the
respective functions of private property and political society? For
Locke, even as Tawney recalls, private property is a sort of a priori
entitlement, part and parcel of human rights in a fundamental if
far-off state of nature, and the basic function of political society is
to protect those rights. From explicitly Lockean foundations, if not
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 155 (1977) C[T]he orthodox idea of
property was that it was a pre-political, Lockean natural right not created by law . . . ").
24. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 528 (1995) ("Theorists such as Richard Epstein, committed to at least
one version of foundational rights, claim to look at the American past but see little more
than John Locke.").
25. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 314-18, 321-22 (1985) (arguing that the
modern welfare state, even in its most modest United States form, violates sound Lockean
principles of property and politics); Robert A. Goldwin, Locke and the Law of the Sea, 71
COMMENTARY, no. 6, June 1981, at 46 passim (opposing on Lockean grounds the provisions
of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty that recognize the seabed as the common
heritage of humankind); D. F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles, 94
L.Q. REV. 103, 104 (1978) (arguing that the common law includes the principle that "[a]ny
expenditure of mental or physical effort, as a result of which there is created an entity,
whether tangible or intangible, vests in the person who brought the entity into being, a
proprietary right to the commercial exploitation of that entity, which right is separate and
independent from the ownership of that entity").
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by the most compelling of steps, modern liberals of the libertarian
stripe derive their minimalist, night-watchman state.
2
In classical terms, Locke explicitly subordinates politics to
ethics, what is more, to an ethics that is radically individualistic.
Every person has "natural" rights to life, liberty, and property;
each person has a reciprocal duty not to interfere with the equal
"natural" rights of every other person. The state is, essentially, a
kind of joint venture the sole legitimate purpose of which is to
protect these individual rights better than individuals themselves
could protect them through purely private means in the "state of
nature."
There is, it is important to see, a common good in Locke's
politics, even as Aristotle said there must be in all political
systems, almost as a matter of logic. 27 But Locke's common good is
little more than the protection of everyone's private rights. Even
Locke's notion of "the commons," the great store of resources
beyond individuals' bodies, is really just a place where individuals
can take what they will, virtually whenever they want.
2. Implications for For-Profit Managers
On first reflection, the minimalist, property-protective society
of Locke's liberalism seems an ideal fit for the minimalist, owner-
oriented view of managerial duties of Friedman's titular epigraph:
The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.
28
But, as soon as Friedman himself begins to unpack that slogan, we
see that this cannot be all:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a
corporate executive is an employe[e] of the owners of
the business. He has direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which
generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society,
both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom.
29
26. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 25, passim.
27. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS passim (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1995) (n.d.).
28. Friedman, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 33; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) ("In [a
free] economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within




Even as Friedman asserts that the manager's primary duty is to
increase owners' profits, he admits two telling social limits: law
and ethical custom.30 As soon as we elaborate those two limits from
Locke's libertarianism, we find that each is far more extensive
than Friedman's statement of business duties would have us
believe.
a. Lockean Limits on Friedman's Profit-Making Mandate
Both Locke's ethics and his politics, radically individualistic
though they are, imply important duties from for-profit managers
to others besides their employers and, even more significantly, for
those owner-managers themselves. These are profoundly
significant for the function of all three of society's public sectors:
the economic, the legal, and the cultural.
This is both most obvious and most relevant in the economic
sector. Owners' use of their private property for profit is, in Locke's
system, subject to their ethical duty not to harm others. This is an
ethical duty, strictly speaking; it is a matter of "natural law" even
when not supported by state sanctions in Locke's ideal political
regime. On this basis, one could found a fair number of seriously
restrictive obligations of business owners themselves, rather like
our common law torts of product liability and fraudulent
misrepresentation. And these ethical limits on owners would
doubly apply to managers; principals must not do through agents
what they must not do themselves. And, under Locke's basic
ethical principles, managers as individuals operate under their
own direct "no-harm" obligation to other individuals.
This ethical obligation of business owners and managers in the
economic sector implies parallel limits on profit-making in the
legal sector. The same Lockean ethical principles that limit the
rights of business owners in the economic sector justify the state
itself in taking on a fairly robust regulatory role. Libertarians like
to think of the Lockean state as a night-watchman, limited to
protecting owners from criminal harm to their persons and
property. But the state might also legitimately enforce private
rights against a wide range of tortious harms as well.
What is more, the legitimacy of these laws implies additional
duties of owners and managers. Because legislation to enforce
these rights of consumers is in accord with the basic function of the
state, business owners and managers could not, as a matter of both
ethics and politics, legitimately oppose such legislation. More
30. Friedman, supra note 1, at 33.
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specifically, they could not lobby legislators to vote against such
legislation, and they could not campaign against legislators on the
basis of their voting for such legislation. They could, of course,
argue that state money spent here might better be spent
somewhere else. But that line of argument would take them,
ultimately, from the expenditure side of the ledger to the revenue
side. And on that side Locke himself imposes a very real limit.
If it is hard to find a principled limit in Locke for business's
anti-regulatory lobbying, it is easy to find a limit for their anti-tax
lobbying. Indeed, as soon as we "map" Friedman's "increase
profits" business mandate onto Locke's ethical and political theory
of taxation, we notice a conflict of interests. Paying taxes is, of
course, a legal obligation, and Friedman admits that business's
pursuit of profit must be legal.31 But behind this legal obligation
lies a business opportunity. Even as the legal obligation to pay
taxes inevitably reduces net profits, so the possibility of lowering
taxes offers an opportunity to increase profits-an opportunity
which, in Friedman's system, would be a right of owners and hence
an obligation of managers. It is entirely legal to lobby to convince
legislators to lower taxes or to campaign to convince voters to elect
legislators who will lower taxes. But how much lower? Friedman's
"increase profits" mandate suggests the answer is asymptotic
toward zero; the lower taxes are, the higher profits will be. Here
Locke's political and ethical theory, individualist though it is,
imposes a very different limit (albeit with a bit of embarrassment):
[It is] true, Governments cannot be supported
without great Charge, and [it is] fit [that] every one
who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay
out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance
of it. 3
2
Like everyone else who enjoys its benefits, business owners
have a duty to pay their fair share of the cost of government;
government only exists, remember, as their joint venture with
other citizens for the mutual protection of private property and
31. Id.
32. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 71-72 (Mark Goldie ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1690). What goes for
estate" goes also for other "natural rights," including both liberty and labor. See id. at 65
(" [He] engages his natural Force ... to assist the Executive Power of the Society, as the Law
thereof shall require. For being now in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy many
Conveniences, from the Labour, Assistance, and Society of others in the same Community,
as well as Protection from its whole Strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural
Liberty, in providing for himself, as the Good, Prosperity, and Safety of the Society shall




other individual rights. If business owners try to lower their legal
tax burden below their fair share, then those owners are, in effect,
breaching their original private contract with their fellow citizens
in forming the state and their on-going obligation under that
contract to both their fellow citizens and the state itself. And,
notice, this is not a "garden-variety," "buyer-seller" business
contract but the very contract on which the entire political
community rests. A business manager who assisted in that effort
would, in Locke's society, be assisting in the breaching of just that
contract.
That said, we must notice the other side to the coin of the
owner-manager relation. Even if managers' duty to owners is, for
soundly Lockean reasons, secondary to their duties to the public,
managers' duties to owners are, of course, prior to managers' own
economic self-interest. That, after all, is what they are basically
for. When we think of "capitalists," we must be careful to avoid
what in America is a false dilemma often posed as "Wall Street vs.
Main Street." Advanced capitalism offers markets for capital itself.
As a result, those who are consumers on one side of the market are
often "investors" on the other.33 Those who produce and consume
on Main Street also invest on Wall Street, particularly though
retirement plans. In fact, of course, the savings of many state
employees (myself included) are largely invested in private
enterprises. With this in mind, we can now appreciate another
problem: managers themselves lobbying to have their fiduciary
duties to owners "lowered" in their own interest. Lockean
principles would seem to forbid this; good evidence suggests that
has happened, rather close to "home" for some of us.34
All of this means that we must, on Locke's own principles,
check several more "boxes" in our matrix of possible fiduciary
duties, the "boxes" indicating duties of both owners and managers
to both fellow citizens and the state. And the "cube" in Figure 3
depicting the dimensions of these duties should cast a shadow that
is deep indeed. Breaching those duties undermines the Lockean
"Social Contract" itself; it is subversion, if not treason. Modern
Lockeans must know that this is perverse, even as they also know
that it is pervasive.
But, again, it may not be, perhaps cannot be, illegal. Even if, on
Lockean principles, the state could not legitimately outlaw these
33. And, even as "investors" are often consumers, so "managers" are, in a very
significant industry, often "owners": the financial services industry.
34. See Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 BUS. LAW. 1761 passim (1994).
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tax-shirking efforts, they would still, on a strictly Lockean
normative analysis, be both ethically and politically wrong. That
brings us to the third public sector, the cultural. For Locke, as for
all liberals, this sector is, as a matter of positive law, both
voluntary and pluralistic. The state cannot adopt an official
ideology of its own, nor can it impose sanctions on the expression
of private opinions, including opinions on ethics and politics. This,
for Locke, is a basic "natural" liberty that individuals cannot "cede"
to the state. Individual expression in a Lockean society must, as a
matter of ethics and politics, be legally free.
But, quite significantly for our analysis, that does not make
legally protected individual expression free of either ethical or
political duties. As we have seen, misleading others for one's own
benefit in both the economic and legal spheres, even if protected
legally, is forbidden both ethically and politically. And the same
conclusion should apply in the cultural sphere as well: In our
ordinary discourse with our fellow-folk, we harm them when we
mislead them; the more serious the subject of our discourse, the
more serious their harm. And, if the harm is intentional, or even
careless, then it is also wrong. Thus, even under strictly Lockean
principles, business owners and their agents are ethically and
politically bound not to mislead their fellows. The temptation will
be great where the potential gain is great: in general, gaining
adherents to the view that what is profitable for business is good
for the public; more specifically, promoting opposition to legitimate
taxation and regulation. The Koch Brothers and their agents, it is
safe to say, read their Locke either very differently or much more
selectively.
All these for-profit managerial duties inferable from Lockean
principles suggest that a particular pair of virtues would be
appropriate for managers: the intellectual virtue of knowing the
public good and the political virtue of commitment to that good.
These are, you may notice, the shared virtues of all professionals.
In addition to their specific "occupational knowledge"-
management or medicine or law35-and the "garden variety"
virtues of care and loyalty to their clients, professionals must also
know how the good of the public limits what they can properly do
for their private clients.36 These professional virtues are not
35. Even the more thorough-going of modern libertarians, it is worth noting, concede
the legitimacy of state regulation to ensure this kind of knowledge. See, e.g., CHARLES
FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 182 (2007) (acknowledging "the
reasonable demand that doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, accountants, and many others be
competent and that the government certify that competence").
36. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC passim (2001).
[Vol. 19
FOR-PROFIT MANAGERS
something for which principals are likely to pay a premium;
properly professional virtues benefit the public, not the principal.
Nor are they virtues that the law can practically impose, because
they involve personal commitments that are hard to police in
practice and improper to impose in principle. And yet, from the
perspective of the functioning of a complex social system, they are
political, not just "personal," virtues: they don't just make
professionals ethically better people, in terms of their own
personal values; they also make the system better, in the narrow
"inside" sense of better serving its own self-defined purposes. This
is true, we can now see, even in a system as fundamentally
individualistic as Locke's liberalism.37
This suggests a final, truly expansive possibility: If professional
virtue were in short supply (for reasons that modern economics
neatly explains, as we shall see), then it would seem that the
Lockean state would need to take affirmative steps to shore it up.
The Lockean state, as a liberal state, could not say that these
virtues were good, absolutely, but it could say that they are
necessary, at least on the part of some, if the Lockean state is to
function best. And, again, if these virtues are in short supply, this
is not merely something the Lockean state could say but
something that, by its own principles, it should say.
The Lockean system, systematically examined, requires more
expansive managerial duties than either its supporters or its
opponents might have thought. The difference between Milton
Friedman and R. H. Tawney is not as great as our epigraphs
suggest, because even Locke's liberal principles move Friedman's
profit-maximizing maxim closer to Tawney. We now need to notice
that Locke holds some surprises in the other direction.
b. Limits on Locke's Limits on Profit-Making (and His Ethics
and His Politics)
Locke's ethical theory of individual rights, as we have seen,
constrains the content of Locke's politics, his norms for all three
public sectors. This ensures that, across a wide range of job-related
activity, managers who are performing their occupational duties
are also acting in accord with their ethical duties. But, we now to
need to notice, the sum of both sets of norms is remarkably "thin."
37. On this theory they are not state-sponsored cartels, as Friedman argues, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 137-60, nor are they merely a means of protecting the "buyers"
of professional services from incompetent "pseudo-professionals." Beyond that, and more




It is only ever negative, about exercising one's freedom without
harming others. It is never positive, about exercising one's freedom
to help one's neighbor or even to improve oneself.
To get a sense of this, notice something peculiar about Lockean
professionalism: Although Locke's politics requires managerial
professionalism to ensure the proper function of all three of his
public sectors, Locke's ethics requires professionalism only in a
distinctly derivative, conditional way. That is, if you decide to
become a manager, you must not do a range of ethically and
politically "bad" things; to avoid doing those bad things, you must
become a properly educated and committed professional.
But deciding to become a manager, as opposed to pursuing
some other career path, is entirely optional, as an ethical matter.
Nothing in Locke's ethics commends the managers' work, or, for
that matter, any other. Locke's ethics does, somewhat surprisingly,
have self-regarding duties. Locke's ethical duties to one's self are
neatly congruent with his ethical duties to others: As you may not
deprive others of their liberty by enslaving them or their life by
killing them, so you may not deprive yourself of your liberty by
enslaving yourself or your life by committing suicide.38 Without
those very wide bounds, you are own your own, left to your own
ethical lights.
This takes us to a more basic point: Locke's ethics itself is
peculiarly limited, and this peculiarity marks, and mars, not
merely Locke's professionalism but also the entire political system
that he builds upon his ethics. Both his ethics and his politics are
fundamentally "negative." This is notoriously true of Lockean
politics; his version of liberalism is perhaps the paradigm of
Berlin's "negative liberty," freedom from state interference.39
But, we need to remember, Locke's politics of negative liberty is
founded, ultimately, on his more basic ethical liberty. Being an
ethical person clearly entails not harming your fellow-folk, but it
does not clearly entail helping them. Cain, in Locke's state of
nature, is surely forbidden to kill Abel; Jacob, in the same state,
seems also free to withhold porridge from Esau until his starving
brother agrees to give up his birth-right in return. In Locke's
world, we are, indeed, our brother's keepers, but we are not
required to keep them very well. Locke's liberalism, often faulted
for being long on liberty and short on equality, has, in fairness, an
38. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 10-14.
39. See BERLIN, supra note 7, passim; see also PETTIT, supra note 7, passim, for a
discussion on "non-interference" versus "non-domination."
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equality perfectly matched to its liberty. What it really lacks is the
third value in the liberal triad, fraternity.
We are, of course, free to adopt a more "siblingly" ethic toward
our fellow-folk; that, as we have seen, is an aspect of the voluntary
pluralism of Locke's cultural sector. We can make our motto, in all
aspects our life, the good of others, or the good of all, including
ourselves.
Here, indeed, we must not be too hard on Locke himself. He,
presumably, assumed that those who followed his politics would
also be following the ethics of the pervasive, and at least nominally
other-regarding, Christianity of his time.40 He did not need to
supplement that religious ethic; he simply needed not to impose
any political obligations in conflict with it. Modern libertarians, of
course, operate against a very different ethical background, from
which at least some of them feel free to choose radically self-
regarding ethical systems.41 Even so, as we have just seen, Locke's
political and ethical theories themselves impose a more robust
range of managerial duties than his latter-day libertarian-leaning
enthusiasts seem to appreciate.
42
But notice that, on this very important point, Friedman's
profit-maximizing mandate presents a problem to which Locke's
system offers no solution. The problem is a potential conflict of
interest. If we are business managers, any additional ethical
duties we adopt and apply in our business life are, strictly
speaking, exogenous and, in that sense, "personal," even
idiosyncratic. On the other hand, any purposes that our employer
wants to advance or indulge, within the political and ethical limits
we have identified, are his prerogative.
40. Indeed, James Penner argues that Locke himself invoked just such limits in
another work, Venditio, to produce his own version of "just price" theory in the tradition of
Aristotle and Aquinas. James Penner, Rights, Distributed and Undistributed: On the
Distributive Justice Implications of Lockean Property Rights, Especially in Land, in
PROPERTY THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 138, 153 (James Penner & Michael
Otsuka eds., 2018) (citing JOHN LOCKE, VENDITIO (1695)).
41. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 passim (1976). Each house of the United States Congress
has recently offered a notable example: Libertarian Speaker of House of Representative
Paul Ryan's declared Ayn Rand his favorite philosopher; Libertarian Senator Rand Paul is
her namesake as well as her admirer.
42. And, we must note, not all of Locke's latter-day enthusiasts are at all libertarian-
leaning. Some, happily, lean distinctly Left; these Left-Lockeans tend to find, to various
degrees disputed among themselves, limits within Locke's own theory on the more
extravagantly private property protective implications that libertarian Lockeans insist on
drawing from the same source. See Penner, supra note 40, at 138 (arguing for an expansive
reading of "Locke['s] famous[] claim[] that first appropriations of the material resources of




This presents a rather dark side to Friedman's observation that
"their desires . . . generally will be to make as much money as
possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both
those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom."
43
Your bosses might, as Friedman suggests, be generally inclined to
make as much profit as is legitimate under Lockean principles.
Then again, they might be willing to sacrifice a bit of their net gain
to engage in a bit of free expression. They might, for example, buy
every employee a bright gold cross or star or crescent. And they
might insist that employees wear those gold symbols at work or
work elsewhere. The less religiously inclined might require a
measure of feudal obeisance. What we would call quid pro quo
sexual harassment would become a contractually grounded droit
de seigneur.
Matching business owners' freedom to hire is their freedom to
sell. Even as owners may decline, for purely personal reasons, to
hire employees, so they may decline, also for purely personal
reasons, to sell to customers. They might, in the exercise of this
aspect of their inherent freedom, reject customers who wear
different religious symbols, customers who exercise different "life-
style preferences," and customers of a different gender or
nationality or race.
44
And, even as owners could, in these ways, exercise their
freedom of contract to limit their profits, so, too, they could
exercise their freedom of contract to increase their profit. In
particular, they could agree with other producers not to hire any
workers above an agreed wage, not to buy from suppliers above a
set price, or not to sell to any consumers below an agreed price.
Not only was this widely done;45 it was widely objected that it was
beyond the state's power to forbid that it be done.46 In the United
States, this gave "trust" a rather unsavory secondary meaning,
synonymous with artificial monopoly.
If we find these corollaries objectionable, we are forced back to
two prospects. We can question whether they are properly derived
from the system's basic premise, the priority of individual liberty,
or we can question that basic premise itself. The first alternative,
43. Friedman, supra note 1, at 33.
44. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723, 1726 (2018); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964).
45. See ATIYAH, supra note 23, at 618 ("The reality of the economy was that oligopoly
and monopoly and anti-competitive Trade Associations existed in almost every industry
throughout the length and breadth of the country [England].").
46. See id. at 619-20 (noting English courts' repeated refusal, in deference to "freedom
of contract," to invalidate various anti-competitive agreements).
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I'm afraid, is more than we have time for; what's more, if we've
gotten it wrong, we haven't gotten it by way of parody. The
conclusions we reached are the same that modern Lockeans
reach.47 The other direction is thus likely to be a more fruitful line
of inquiry: Where does Locke get the primacy of individual liberty
in the form on which he bases his entire social system?
All the objectionable features of the array of managerial duties
implicit in Locke's regime trace back to the sole end of that regime:
protecting individual liberty. That, in turn, presses us back to that
liberty itself (both epistemologically and ontologically): How do we
know that this is the ultimate human good? Here we find two
bases that, in Locke's theory, seem to complement each other.
48
The first basis is God,49 and a distinctly sovereign, and
Christian, God. How do we know that each person's life and liberty
and labor are inalienably their own? Because God set things up
that way. How do we know that the world is a commons, open to
all for unilateral acquisition as private property? Because God said
so, in the first chapter of Genesis.50 To Locke's credit, we are
inclined to think, he generally shows how God's otherwise
inscrutable arrangements make eminent human sense. Perhaps,
for all we know, Locke's theological arguments were more
rhetorical than real; in any case, we do know that Locke's current
fans tend to claim that his system, with a minimum of adjustment,
can rest on a thoroughly secular foundation.
51
This second, secular foundation is a special kind of reasoning,
which Robert Nozick describes as "knock-down" arguments; as he
notes, this kind of argument, on this kind of issue, has come into
distinct disfavor.52 This is, no doubt, the kind of disfavor that R. H.
Tawney alluded to when he said in the passage with which we
began: "To-day that doctrine, if intellectually discredited, is still
the practical foundation of social organization." 53 You yourself may
have independently concluded the same; I must say-with neither
shame nor pride-that I have.
47. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 25, passim.
48. See Jargen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections, 76
DENV. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1999) ("Proponents of natural right theories, on the other side,
derive the legitimacy of positive law immediately from a higher moral law .... [N]atural
law, which is explained in metaphysical or religious terms.").
49. See ATIYAH, supra note 23, at 48 ("Locke is none too specific about the source of
Natural Law, but it is clearly associated with the laws of God.").
50. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 14-16.
51. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 11.
52. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 4-5, 8 (1981) (recommending
'philosophical arguments," which make "[v]arious philosophical things . . . coherent and
better understood," over the "[c]oercive [p]hilosophy" of "knockdown argument[s]").
53. TAWNEY, supra note 2, at 24-25.
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What matters, at this point in our analysis, is that a
profoundly important line of thinking turned away from Locke on
this fundamental point and tried to build a normative vision of our
modern liberal society on different foundations. What is more, this
new vision tried to redress the unacceptable results that Locke
derived from his foundation. We need to examine that vision not
only because it is a sensible response to Locke but also because it
is well ensconced in all three public sectors of our modern liberal
society. That model, like Locke's, has important implications for
the scope and content of for-profit managers' duties.
B. Modern Liberal Society: What's Good for the Bees Is Good
for the Hive (And What's Good Is an Aggregation
of Individual Desires)
Modern impatience with the metaphysics of traditional natural
law theories like Locke's is nowhere better captured than in
Bentham's famous fulmination: "Natural rights is simple
nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense H -nonsense upon stilts." 54 Bentham, of course, offered
his alternative, hedonistic utilitarianism as a universal solvent for
all the problems he associated with the likes of Locke. As we will
need to remind ourselves, this raised at least as many questions as
it answered; it might fairly be argued that it begged the very basic
"natural law" questions it intended to avoid. But, in its effort to
avoid those questions, if not answer them, it gave a radically new,
and profoundly useful, way of looking at all three public sectors of
liberal society. The implications of Bentham's liberalism for the
economic sector are both the most relevant to our analysis and the
most different from Locke's theory. We will look at that sector first,
then turn to the legal sector, and, finally, to the cultural.
1. The Economic Sector: The Sovereignty of Aggregate Consumer
Satisfaction
We need to look, first, at Bentham's critique of Locke's
economics, then at modern economists' modification of Bentham,
and, finally, at the implications of modern economics for the
fiduciary duties of for-profit managers.
54. JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES; BEING AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS ISSUED DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1789), reprinted in 2
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 501 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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a. Bentham's Shifting of Locke's Foundations (and
Foundationalism)
To better to appreciate Bentham's revolutionary effect on
Lockean economics, we must step back a generation, to Adam
Smith's The Wealth of Nations55 (not coincidentally, the go-to text
for much of modern laissez-faire opposition to expanding both
government regulation generally and for-profit managers' fiduciary
duties in particular).56 Smith offers two insights critical to our
analysis. First, Smith makes explicit what Locke only implies:
Capitalist producers supply our wants out of concern, not for our
welfare, but for their own.57 Second, and more important, Smith
implicitly refocuses the functionalist analysis of capitalism itself.
From Smith on, economics focuses on the satisfaction of our
desires, not the property rights of the capitalist. His very title tips
his hand: What concerns us is the wealth of nations, not the
private property rights, much less the individual profits, of
capitalists themselves.
In Bentham's hands, this shift of focus is radicalized: Both
private property and capitalist enterprise are to be justified only in
turns of their social function. More famously, Bentham radicalized
the function of society itself. For Locke, it was to protect individual
"natural" rights; for Bentham, it was to promote the greatest good
of the greatest number. Reduced to its essence, Bentham's
argument comes to this: Everyone desires his own happiness, even
as Locke's theory acknowledges. The next step is a marvelous trick
of legerdemain at least as old as sophism itself: Happiness is what
all people desire, therefore happiness is desirable. Bentham
famously, if unfortunately, tried to equate happiness with
pleasure, and to make all pleasures equal: "Prejudice apart, the
game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of
music and poetry."58 That leveling is a serious problem, to which
we'll return. But that leveling hugely simplifies economic analysis,
to which we now turn. All measurements will be quantitative, not
55. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Bantam Classics 6th
ed. 2003) (1776).
56. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 1-2 (1980).
57. SMITH, supra note 55, passim.
58. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD (1825), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 54, at 189, 253; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN




qualitative.5 9 All that Bentham's analysis required was a "felicific
calculus." That, alas, proved as elusive as the Philosopher's Stone.
b. From Bentham's Utilitarianism to Orthodox Modern
Economics
What Bentham, alas, failed to find, classical economics
provided: another simplifying assumption. People's satisfaction,
damned difficult to measure directly, might be equated with what
they are both willing and able to pay for.60 Human desires could
thus be measured in dollars (or, if less alliteratively, any other
standard currency unit). This simplifying move itself raises as
many problems as the Benthamite assumptions on which it rests.
We will have to examine some of them shortly. But what we need
to remember is that this is the foundation of modern economic
analysis, and that modern economic analysis, with Bentham,
stands Lockean economics on its head: Private property
fundamentally, and capitalist's profits derivatively, are not ends in
themselves but merely means to satisfying aggregate consumer
demand.
Modern economic analysis essentially re-writes the social
contract between capitalists and society. With respect to property
itself, capitalists no longer come to the table with pre-existing
ownership of the means of production; instead, society recognizes
private property interests in the means of production only insofar
as it suits society's primary economic end, maximum aggregate
consumer satisfaction. With respect to the profits from capitalist
property, capitalists are no longer entitled to all but their pro rata
share in the cost of government; instead, they are entitled to only
so much as is necessary to get them to engage in producing the
goods and services consumers want. On Lockean principles,
property is a right, and its fruits belong to its owners; on modern
economic principles, property is a trust,6 1 and profits no more than
the price paid for its management.
59. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 459 (1974) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973)).
60. See Leff, supra note 59, at 478.
61. This insight offers the prospect of expanding Criddle's modern republican theory
to include a much larger range of fiduciary duties. See Criddle, supra note 7, at 1032
(arguing that '[a] defining feature of any fiduciary relationship is entrusted power" and
noting that "[p]ower may be entrusted.., by the independent operation of law').
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c. Modern Economics' Implications for Manager's Duties
This inversion of Locke's theory of private property, and with it
the economic system that libertarians try to derive from that
theory, has huge implications for our analysis of the duties of for-
profit managers. We have time and space only to look at these
implications in broadest outline.6 2 We begin with the areas of
agreement between Locke and modern economists. Even here we
see that the new foundations alter the arrangement, generally
pressing toward expansion of duties that Locke recognized. Then
we turn to the areas of disagreement, focusing on a few of the
problems we have identified with those duties as derived from
Locke's theory.
The areas of overlap are both large and significant. Modern
economics, like Lockean ethics, nicely under-pins the basic
managerial duties to enterprise owners: loyalty and care. And
modern economics, like Locke, implies a general duty on both
owners and managers not to harm others. Beyond that, modern
economics offers useful insights into how harm might be
understood. Locke's theory of property, for example, required
individuals to take from the common, but only so long as good
enough is left for all; modern economics explains why rational self-
maximizing individuals, acting independently, tend to over-use
common resources to the tragic detriment of all, including
themselves.6 3 And this, in turn, implies additional legitimate
functions of the state, which, again, business owners and
managers cannot legitimately resist.
So, too, with taxation. Modern economics sees the state's
legitimate "take" not only as the business owner's fair share of a
"night-watchman" state but also as any profit beyond the
minimum necessary to encourage optimal production.6 4 This, you
62. For a fuller treatment, see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 197, 197
("restat[ing] the economic theory of fiduciary law" and "providing an updated and improved
synthesis"). See generally Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Post Ante: The
Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 209; Richard R. W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary
Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 225;
Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 242; Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 10, at 261.
63. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at
1243, 1244-45.
64. Paul Krugman, The Economics of Soaking the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019),
https ://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax-policy-dance.html;
Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to
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will notice, is nothing more than the Laffer curve from a different
direction.6 5 Even as this larger tax bill is legitimate, so owners' and
managers' efforts to reduce that bill below this new, higher level is
illegitimate.
And so, finally, with the professionalism of managers. The
duties that Locke's system imposed on managers, as we have
seen,66 implied that they would have to know and serve the
common good, as do all proper functionalist professions. What
distinguishes each is their serving the public good through the
application of their particular area of expert knowledge. The
modern economists' perspective requires not only that the
manager learn and serve a very different view of the common good
but also that they have a much more elaborate set of technical
tools specific to their managerial task.6
7
Here modern economic theory both requires and explains a
basic institution of modern liberal society, the university. For
reasons that modern economic theory also explains, the university
is essentially an institution of the cultural sector, where we will
consider it in more detail.
In all these areas of agreement with Lockean theory as to
proper imposition of fiduciary duties on owners and managers,
modern economic theory tends to produce duties that are "bigger"
than their Lockean counterparts. Even where Locke checks the
same "boxes" as modern economic theory, that theory builds much
bigger "cubes."
The more dramatic differences from Locke's liberalism, though,
lie in the new duties that modern economics would impose on
owners and managers. All these differences derive, we need to
remember, from modern economics' radical reversal of Locke's
theory of property. For Locke, private property is an irreducible,
pre-political natural right; for modern economics, it is a social
institution to be shaped to fit social functions.
To begin with the starkest difference, recall the Lockean
position on price-raising agreements among capitalist producers.
For Locke, they are implicitly permitted, because capitalists are
free to sell at whatever prices they like. For modern economists,
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 171 (2011) (discussing optimal top tax
rate of seventy-three percent).
65. Laffer Curve, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/laffercurve.asp
(last updated Nov. 25, 2019).
66. See text supra p. 20 (explaining why managers in Lockean theory would need to
know, for example, why not to oppose appropriate levels of taxation even if lower levels
would mean higher profits).
67. Rob Atkinson, An Elevation of Neo-Classical Professionalism in Law and Business,
12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 665 (2014).
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they are implicitly forbidden, because their manifest purpose is to
decrease consumer satisfaction by raising prices above the
minimum required to cover production costs and keep capitalists
in business. Owners are forbidden to engage in price-fixing
agreements, and their managers are forbidden to help them.
This prohibition, in turn, is but a corollary of a more basic, and
more positive, obligation: Owners directly, and managers by
derivation as their agents, have a duty to consumers to supply
goods and services at market prices (because market prices tend to
be the lowest possible cost-covering prices). Other corollaries are
less obvious but equally important. One is a dramatic limit on
discrimination toward employees and consumers. Replacing the
basis of Lockean economics, protecting the owner's right to
freedom of contract, with the basis of modern economics,
maximizing aggregate consumer satisfaction, directly undermines
the basis for owners' discriminating against consumers. And it
undermines owners' discrimination against employers only a little
less directly. Owners' indulgence of any private preferences at the
expense of cost-effective production tends to mean costlier products
and thus less consumer satisfaction. Owners of business, under
modern economic theory, are no longer lord and ladies of their
Lockean manors; now they themselves are but managers of the
estate-more precisely, the public's estate.
In light of this expansion of the duties of owners and managers,
we need to underscore two important points. The first is that this
entire set of rights and duties is based on modern liberal
economics, market capitalism. They derive, not from the rights of
either owners or managers, whatever the source of those rights
might be, but from the rights of consumers, grounded in economic
theory. We will see, in the next section, that consumers' rights, in
modern liberalism, rest on a legal foundation of democratic
politics. What we need to see here is that consumers' rights are
derived, as a functional matter, from entirely orthodox economics.
This is the second point: The economic system that implies
these rights is a capitalism market system, understood in its own
terms. This view of capitalism is the prevailing capitalist view of
capitalism. In the United States it is called the Chicago School;
68
nowhere is it called the school of Athens or Jerusalem, much less
Leningrad or even Geneva. This is not Marx's dialectical
materialism, or Tawney's "democratic socialism." It is, rather, a
thoroughly orthodox neo-classical account of the (merely
68. See generally POSNER, supra note 59.
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instrumental) virtues of (properly regulated and supplemented)
capitalism.
Capitalism, on this view, is a goose that has reliably laid
golden eggs. It is a domestic animal; it is neither a sacred cow nor
a lapdog, and it needn't be a tribal totem. Take it on the testimony
of a rural veterinarian's son and sometime assistant: Geese are
always messy and sometimes mean, especially when you go to
collect "their" eggs.
d. The Floating Foundation of Modern Economics
Modern economic analysis has built, on Benthamite
foundations, a liberal theory of capitalist property and profit
radically at odds with Lockean liberal theory. And modern
economic theory, in turn, produces a set of managerial duties that
is much more robust than that of Lockean theory. Even as it
recognizes the need for a duty of care and loyalty to managers, it
insists that these duties are subordinate to owners' own expanded
duty to consumers-not only a negative duty not to cheat or
physically hurt them but also an affirmative duty to give them
maximum possible return on their consumer dollars (at minimum,
necessary return to the capitalist's own private investment).
But this impressive edifice, for better or worse, rests on a most
peculiar foundation. Even as modern economic analysis jettisons
the a priori natural rights foundation of Locke's theory, it
substitutes a doubly questionable foundation of its own. It is
questionable, in one sense, from "outside" the theory; we can call
into question Bentham's hedonistic utilitarianism as easily as we
can call into question Locke's natural law foundations. And so we
will, a little later. But, we need to notice now, the foundations of
economic analysis are questionable in another way, and this way is
"inside" the theory itself.
In modern economic theory, as we have seen, the purpose of
capitalist markets is to satisfy aggregate consumer demand (at
lowest possible cost). But, we need to notice, this purpose itself is
conditional, not absolute. In Kantian terms, the basic structure of
the economic theory of capitalism is a hypothetical, not a
categorical, imperative69 : If you want to maximize aggregate
consumer satisfaction, and if you find that capitalist production
more or less often performs that function best (as compared with
69. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White




production in any one of the other social sectors), then you should
establish and maintain capitalism.
The conditional nature of this imperative takes us to the basic
problem of modern liberal political theory: Who is to say whether
we should build an economy on the basis of aggregate consumer
satisfaction? The answer, in the law of modern liberal democratic
states, is "We, the People" (in the aggregate).
2. The Legal Sector: The Sovereignty of Majority Voter Preference
The relationship among the members may be less than they
intended. Like its economic system, modern liberalism's legal
system reflects a major inversion of Locke. For him, liberal
political regimes exist to protect pre-existing individual rights,
which Locke conveniently subsumed under the heading
"property."70 Political majoritarianism is nothing more than a
balance wheel in that system, a necessary means to avoid electoral
and legislative deadlocks.7 1 Political majorities cannot override
natural, pre-political rights, which include private property rights
as well as rights to life and liberty. In Locke's version of liberal
democracy, then, democracy is the handmaid of liberalism, in both
economics and law.
For modern liberal economists, as we have seen, the entire
edifice of capitalism exists only to maximize aggregate consumer
satisfaction. The decision to have an economy with the goal of
consumer satisfaction is left, in modern liberal political systems, to
the will of political majorities. Rights to capitalist property and
profit are limited, then, by majoritarian politics. But so, too, are
the rights of life and liberty as well. In modern liberal legal
systems, in other words, liberalism itself is the handmaid of
democracy, in law as well as in economics.
Unlike modern liberal economic theory, which has a principled
way of coordinating its two key elements, "capitalist" and
"market," modern liberal legal theory has no generally accepted
theory for accommodating its two key elements, "liberal" and
"democratic." No liberal politics, it is safe to say, has satisfactorily
"squared the circle" of liberal democracy.7 2 What we need to notice
70. This is a foundation that at least some modern libertarians are themselves willing
both to concede and to question. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 35, at 79-80 (conceding Locke's
reliance on pre-political, natural rights to property); id. at 183 (conceding that conflicts
between other basic commitments "and individual liberty cannot be definitively resolved by
any formula or deduction from first principles").
71. See LOCKE, supra note 32, at 66-71.
72. See Habermas, supra note 48, at 939-40 (noting the difficulty of reconciling
popular sovereignty with liberal versions of human rights).
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is that, as a strictly legal matter, all actual democracies tend, in
their very foundational laws, to subordinate liberalism to
democracy. This has, of course, huge implications for the
liberalism of our law, particularly in an era of resurgent populist
nationalism. What we need to examine now, admittedly more
modestly, are its implications for the duties of for-profit managers.
We have just noted the most basic economic implication of
democracy for modern liberal law: The people could, by entirely
legal means, abolish the entire system of private property and
capitalist production. That, of course, is not in the cards. But a
kind of lesser included prospect is far more likely, if not actually in
evidence: The people could accept the premise of modern
economics "Yes, we want maximum consumer satisfaction"
without heeding the mandate that follows from that premise-
"Then you should establish and maintain a capitalist system of
production." The people and their legislative representatives, most
basically, could fail to enact and maintain the kind of legal
infrastructure that the optimal, or even minimal, functioning of
capitalism requires. This would, of course, be irrational. But it
would not, notice, be undemocratic. And, not to put too fine a point
on it, this seems to be what electorates in liberal democracies
around the world are actually doing.
Remember, in this connection, that the traditional source of
both basic property law and basic business law is common-law
adjudication. There is good, if disputed, evidence that common law
judges "made" much of this law with an eye, however theoretically
unenlightened, toward the goal of modern liberal economics: the
maximization of aggregate consumer satisfaction.73 There is also
good, if disputed, evidence that at least some of the legal
infrastructure of capitalism would better be made wholesale, by
legislation or agency rule-making, rather than retail, by the case-
by-case adjudications of the common law.
74
But notice that this latter argument contains an important, but
only implicit, premise: Law made by legislatures and
administrative bodies can only improve over judge-made law if
legislators and administrators both know how to run a capitalist
system properly and are committed to that function. And
remember that, even as modern liberalism subordinates
liberalism, both economic and legal, to democracy, so it also
subordinates judge-made common law to statutes and rules made
73. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 59.
74. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (9th ed. 2017), for a discussion on
nuisance law and environmental controls.
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by legislators and administrators. And remember, finally, that the
liberal legal protection of free speech permits capitalists to fund
campaigns for political office in both the legislative and executive
(and, in some places, even the judicial) branches of government.
75
This, of course, poses a huge problem for modern liberalism,
both in practice and in theory: Capitalists can as a matter of law
secure, and have as a matter of fact secured, legislation and
regulation that undercuts the function of capitalism as defined by
economists. They could attack, and have attacked, a host of
regulatory arrangements that were designed, in a more
"progressive" era, to limit many of the whimsical prerogatives for-
profit owners and managers and to internalize many of the costs of
capitalist production and. Pollution is the most salient example of
this latter trend, not least because, if unabated, it may destroy the
very possibility of life on earth. And they, have, of course,
restructured tax regimes to ensure that their after-tax returns on
investments are far above what economists say is an appropriate
minimum, the level that achieves an optimal level of production.76
3. The Cultural Sector
The cultural sector of modern liberalism, like that of Lockean
liberalism, is both voluntary and pluralistic. Basically, the state
cannot forbid individuals to hold any set of beliefs, and the state
cannot promote any of its own beliefs as ultimately true or good.
But it does, and in theory it legitimately could, point out that
certain beliefs underlie its own proper function. This, too, is
subject to democratic law-making. Just as democracy might fail to
provide the legal infrastructure for capitalism, so it might fail to
provide the cultural infrastructure.
This latter prospect is especially important in light of the
importance of universities in liberal societies, even, as we have
seen, in strictly economic terms. Locke's system implied a very
limited kind of professionalism; modern liberalism implies a very
much broader professionalism. And that broader professionalism
75. See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-25 (11th Cir. 2002) (declaring
unconstitutional state limits on judicial campaign activities).
76. The most obvious, if not the most egregious, example is the Trump-inspired round
of tax relief to the rich in the United States, grounded (to the extent that it can be said to be
grounded at all) on a "trickle-down" theory of economics that virtually no serious economists
actually believe. See Krugman, supra note 64; see also Will Kenton, Trickle-Down Theory,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trickledowntheory.asp (last updated
July 14, 2019) (defining "trickle-down theory").
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implies a very much more significant academy. It is, after all, the
academy that has given us the theory of capitalism with which we
are now working. As we have seen, this theory is a sort of "owners'
guide" to capitalism: If you want a thriving capitalist economy,
then here's what you should do. Similarly, academic lawyers who
specialize in the legal infrastructure of capitalism must explain the
relative advantages and disadvantages, the costs and benefits, of
various technical alternatives: when, for example, bright line
"rules" produce better, more efficient results than flexible
"standards." And this particular institution thus implies a very
significant value: the truth.77 If academics are to do their job well,
they must explain the economy as it best functions. (This
functionally true importance of truth is perhaps self-evident; in an
era of "alternative truths," you will pardon the emphasis.)
The rise of modern economics and its displacement of both
Bentham and Locke points to a second critical function of
academics in modern society. Modern academics not only showed
us practical problems with Bentham and how to get 'round them.
They also showed us fundamental theoretical problems with both
Bentham and Locke. Nor, of course, was theirs the first example of
that second academic function. Locke, himself an academic, had
displaced an earlier political theory of absolute monarchy with his
own liberal theory. The volume of Locke we focus on is the
second;78 we are able to focus on it because no one now sees the
need to revisit the first volume's task, theoretically de-throning
absolute monarchism.79 (This points to the paradox Clinton
Rossiter long ago observed about American conservatives: To the
extent that are conserving the likes of Locke, they are conserving a
radical tradition.)80 Ultimately, of course, that process of critical
social analysis goes back at least to Plato's own academy, where he
wrote the original integrated study of ethics and politics.
And, of course, that process of critical social analysis goes
forward as well as backward. Modern economists did not just show
us the flaws in Bentham and Locke, nor did they merely give us, as
a technical matter, the owners' manual of their refurbished
capitalism. They and other scholars also remind us that the basic
premise of capitalism, satisfying aggregate consumer demand, is
77. See generally FREIDSON, supra note 36, for a discussion on truth as a core value of
the professionalism of scientists, both "physical" and "social."
78. See discussion supra Section II.A.
79. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 289 (3d ed. 2008).
80. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 67-70 (1955).
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open to question. And that, of course, poses our own question:
What are the alternatives?
Those alternatives are the "products" on which Socrates
worked, ethics and politics. 81 That work was the crime for which
Athenian democrats executed him. Both the theory and the history
of modern liberal economics strongly suggests that they would
have done better to impose the sentence Socrates himself
suggested: a life-time meal-ticket.
8 2
4. Modern Liberalism's Ethics
Within the limits of liberal politics, including the obligations
imposed by liberal law and the functional requirements of for-
profit management, individual managers are free, in modern
liberal society as in Locke's, to do as they like. The modern liberal
cultural sector gives many ethical options, but few are well-
integrated with liberal politics. In particular, liberal professional
ethics tends to treat ethics and politics as ultimately
incommensurate; this means that managers and other
professionals must choose to elevate either their ethics or their
politics over the other. The basic problem is that liberal
professional ethicists tend to accept a modern view of economics
and law, in which clients are entitled to do what is unethical but
legal and profitable, and try to reconcile it with the professional's
obligation to be ethical.8 3 Beyond that, modern liberalism offers
professionals little guidance on how to live their lives outside the
requirements of their work or how to choose that work itself.
Republicanism is fairly seen as an offer to fill these twin gaps.
C. Neo-Classical Republican Society: What's Good for the Bee and
Good for the Hive Is Good (Which Is-No Spoiler Alert
Necessary!-Socrates, Satisfied)
Even as reservations with Locke's liberalism led us to examine
the alternative of modern liberalism, so reservations about modern
liberalism press us on to our third and final liberal alternative,
neo-classical republicanism. As in our two earlier analyses, we
81. See PLATO, APOLOGY, reprinted in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 109, 112 (Benjamin
Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1892) ("Is there any one who understands human
and political virtue?").
82. Id. at 129-30.
83. This is, admittedly, a very tight summary of a huge, and hugely helpful,
literature; the fault, as it tries to show, lies not in the scholars, but in the system.
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begin with its politics, its view on how to organize the best society,
looking at what that politics implies for all three public sectors, the
economic, the legal, and the cultural. We then turn to its ethics, its
view on how to be the best possible person. All through we will be
looking particularly for the light that republicanism sheds on the
proper fiduciary duties of for-profit managers.
1. The Economic Sector
Our analysis of republican economics must focus on its points
of agreement and disagreement with modern liberal economics.
The basic division is this: On the one hand, republicanism takes
the economic theory that modern liberalism built on Bentham's
foundations as essentially sound; if you want to satisfy aggregate
consumer preferences, market capitalism is a fine means to that
end. Republicanism admits, with modern liberals, that modern
economic theory may be flawed in its details, but republicanism
nonetheless holds, like modern liberalism, that those can be
corrected within the general framework of neo-classical
economists. On the other hand, republicanism radically questions
the basic economic premise of both Bentham and modern liberal
economics: that all consumer preferences are to be treated as
equal. We discuss, first, republicanism's areas of agreement with
modern liberalism, then its differences.
a. Areas of Agreement
This topic deserves a separate heading for the same reason
that some sentences deserve a separate paragraph: Republicanism
accepts all the working principles of neo-classical economics, and
all that these principles imply for both the fiduciary duties of for-
profit managers and the functions of the liberal state.
b. Areas of Disagreement
As the areas of agreement between republicans and modern
liberals are extremely wide, so the area of their disagreement is
very narrow. But, alas, it is also very deep. To understand that
depth, and the difference it makes for managerial duties, we must
look briefly back at the foundations of modern liberal economics.
As you recall, both Bentham and the modern economists who
modified his system decline to rank different pleasures, though
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they come to this position from very different directions. Bentham
refused to distinguish among pleasures84 because he believed he
had proved them all equal. He, again, famously pronounced that
the pleasures of poetry are ultimately no better than those of push-
pin.85 Modern economists, on the other hand, refuse to distinguish
among pleasures not because they believe they are all equal but
because that refusal avoids the problem of finding an accepted, or
acceptable, standard. By different paths, then, and for somewhat
different reasons, Bentham and the founders of modern liberal
economics came to the same basic conclusion, which they make the
basic premise of their entire economic system: All consumer
satisfaction counts the same.
Republican economics emphatically rejects that premise, over
against both Bentham and modern economists. In this we are not
alone; indeed, I believe, we are in better company: Bentham's
heretical disciple, John Stuart Mill (who was no mean modern
economist himself). According to Mill:
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a
pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a
different opinion, it is because they only know their
own side of the question.
86
Mill could, alas, have made his point more charitably; greater
charity must, perforce, be part of the mandate of republicanism.
But he could not have put his point more accurately, and on that
point republican economics rests (as, we will see, does the rest of
its politics, its law and its culture, and all of its ethics).
We who know both sides of the question know that some
pleasures are better than others, and we know why. We moderns
mock Milton's party on many points, not least because, we say,
they banned bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bears,
but because it gave pleasure to the spectators.87 A mere moment's
reflection reveals the truth: It must have been both, the bear's pain
and the spectator's pleasure. This is no way for humans to treat an
animal, because it is worse than beastly, because it lowers humans
below animals.
84. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD (1825), reprinted in 2 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 54, at 253.
85. Id.
86. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14 (Oskar Piest ed., MacMillan Pubi g Co.
1957) (1863).
87. "The Puritan hated bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bear, but because
it gave pleasure to the spectators." 1 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND
FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SECOND 156 (New York, Harper & Brothers 1879).
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c. Implications for the Duties of For-Profit Managers
From the perspective of republican economics, the mandate of
liberal economics cannot get us where we need to go, because it
heads us in the wrong direction. Owners and managers merely
pursuing maximum profits, even under the consumer-regarding
constraints that modern liberalism imposes, will not ensure that
they produce the socially optimal mix of goods and services. To
approach that optimal mix, owners and managers must seek to
produce not those goods and services that most satisfy consumers
(at a sustainable rate of return on investment) but instead those
goods and services that, at the minimum, harm consumers least
and, at the optimum, benefit consumers the most.
Lest this basic republican economic goal seem utopian, we
must focus first on its minimum, doing the least harm. Although
this standard is emphatically not a part of our current economic
theory, it is deeply rooted in widely shared social norms. That,
presumably, is why we tend to look askant at pornographers,
cigarette manufacturers, and venders of cheap intoxicants. It is not
because selling these products is not profitable; it is because these
profits come, by our best lights, at real harm to consumers
themselves.
Nor is it hard to find evidence of the optimal end of the
republican goal, doing consumers the most good. Henry Ford
seemed less interested in increasing his personal wealth than in
making automobiles affordable to people of modest means, the
better to enhance their lives. (The suit against him by his co-
investors, the founders of a competing motor company, reminds us
that you can do that sort of thing with your own money, but not
with the money of nonconsenting investors.)88 And, even in our
own post-industrial age, we still hear echoes of Ford's sentiment:
Mark Zuckerburg says the real point of Facebook is to connect
people in a radically new, and better, way; Apple announces every
new i-thing as the key to opening bright new avenues of human
achievement. Quite likely, of course, these great humanitarian
goals are exaggerated, if not fabricated. The point here is not that
the entrepreneurs are virtuous, but rather that, even at their most
hyperbolic and hypocritical, they are paying homage to what we
ourselves recognize as a virtuous motive: doing good, as they say,
while doing well.
88. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684-85 (Mich. 1919) (holding in Ford's
favor, on the thoroughly republican principle that what was good for Ford's consumers, at
least in this case, was also good for Ford's investors).
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This is not to say, of course, that virtuous motive is enough
under the republican economic norm. Henry Ford had some
notoriously obnoxious ideas, antisemitism most salient among
them, and the more we see of Mark Zuckerburg, the scarier he
seems. But this cuts for, rather than against, the basic republican
model: We have shared standards by which we can measure the
good that capitalists purport to do. By their fruits, we can judge
them-and, on republican principles, so we should. And our
judgment, we need to note, is not idiosyncratic; we are not acting
arbitrarily, like Locke's lords of the manor. It is principled, and
that principle is a corollary of the basic mandate of republican
economics: Do not just satisfy consumer preferences, agnostic to
the good of those preferences; do consumers as much good
(including as little harm) as you can, by shared standards of
human need and human excellence.
But who, in the last analysis, is to say what those standards
are? That question is best answered under the heading of
republican culture. But, even as we defer that question, we need to
note that, if republican managers are to function properly under
republican economic principles, they must know what that answer
is. Learning it, accordingly, must be a part of their basic
professional training. As modern liberalism requires of managers
more training than Locke, so neo-classical republicanism requires
yet more again. Here, though, we come to a limit, because neo-
classical republicanism requires the broadest and deepest
education we have yet imagined, the "classical" ideal of liberal
education.
This Millean position on the economic sector has profound
consequences for the republic's legal sector, its balancing of
democracy and liberalism, which in turn has profound effects on
its cultural sector.
2. The Legal Sector
Republicanism is famous, of course, not for its position on the
economic system, but for its prescription for the legal system: in
the just state, the wise rule for the good of all. In the latter half of
the last century, alas, the republican tradition came to be
associated, paradoxically more in the academic than in the popular
mind,89 with totalitarianism rather than with either liberalism or
89. The standard citation here is 1 K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES
(Princeton Univ. Press 4th ed. 1963) (1945), wherein Plato is made the father of
totalitarianism in both its fascist and its communist forms. Id. at 86.
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democracy. Even if I were the person, this would still not be the
place to rehabilitate republicanism tout court.90 But we must,
within the limits of our task, notice that republicanism is, in fact,
consistent with both liberalism and democracy in their modern
forms. And we must notice that the form of republican law is just
the form of the managerial professionalism we have already
identified in modern liberalism's economic sector.
Here the most basic point, and the point most easily made, is
that many of the founders of modern liberal democracy built on
explicitly republican foundations. The most prominent promoters
of the United States Constitution were, for example, remarkably
republican on this essential point:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to
be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society; and in the next place, to
take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public
trust.91
Here we have, in barest outline, a way to accommodate
republicanism and democracy. The people's will is not the source of
the good, as in popular sovereignty, but the people's voice is the
means by which the rulers are both chosen and kept to their task:
ruling for the good of all.
Here, too, we find a familiar pattern. Those who should rule, in
the vision of the authors of one of the most durable modern liberal
constitutions, are those with the most basic virtues of the kind of
professionalism we have already identified: the highest virtue of
the mind, knowledge of the common good, wedded to the highest
virtue of the heart, commitment to that good. The Federalists'
statesman, like our proper business managers, are thus cut from a
common mold.
Noticing this common professional stamp points to an even
deeper compatibility of republicanism and democracy, of which the
Federalists were quite well aware. The actual drafting of their
constitution, like the ideal development of our fiduciary duties,
was in the hands of the wise, committed to ruling for the good of
all. In the actual operation of their law, as we have seen,
democracy was reduced to the best means to the best end, rule of
90. See PETTIT, supra note 7, passim.
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 295 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., Liberty Fund Gideon ed. 2001).
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the wise for the good of all. But, in the inauguration of their law,
the Federalists gave not just democracy but something like
popular sovereignty pride of place: their Constitution begins with
the words "We the People of the United States";92 their regime
began when elected members of conventions in each of the states
ratified their constitution.
When it was founded, the United States was something very
like a neo-classical republic; that we have lapsed from that
arrangement of late is rather, I think, to be lamented than
celebrated. On the Federalist view, liberal democratic law, like
capitalist market economics, works best in the hands of proper
professionals.93 It is no insult, but rather the reverse, to believe
that the people themselves, if properly led, will themselves see it
that way. Republicanism is not merely compatible with modern,
post-Enlightenment democracy; it is, rather, that very democracy
in its most fully functioning form.
But what of liberalism, the other element of liberal democratic
law? Does republicanism not pose a threat to liberalism analogous
to the threat that democracy poses? A fuller theoretical answer
will have to await our discussion of republican ethics, where we
see the kind of person that the republic is not only to protect but
also to foster. Here we can only point back to the regime of rights
the Federalists established in the United States, and even further
back to the fate of Socrates: In the Republic, those found to have
criticized the very foundations of the state will not be punished
with death, as the popular party in Athens successfully argued;
they will be rewarded, even as Socrates suggested, with a life
pension.
Republicanism is thus more liberal than modern liberalism's
fraternal twin, democracy. What is more surprising is that
republicanism is more liberal than modern liberalism.
Republicanism undertakes to teach the values and virtues of
liberty to the people; republicanism trusts that, properly tutored,
the people will not only respect liberal values and virtues but also
make those values their own. But, if they reject them, republicans
neither console themselves that the people's will is nonetheless
being done nor fumble with the Gordian knot of liberal rights and
92. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
93. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) ("The aim of every political
constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to




popular sovereignty. Republicanism cuts that knot. It places
liberal values in the hands of those who will hold them most
firmly, be they ever so few, not those who will let them lapse, be
they urged on by ever so many. If the people take an illiberal path,
republicanism condemns their turn as wrong and urges them to
follow the better angels of their nature. To be a republican is to
make that your job; more precisely, your job is to recognize
yourself as a fiduciary of liberal values, even as you are fiduciary
of fiduciary duties.
3. The Cultural Sector
Even as our neo-classical republican society must have a legal
sector that is both liberal and democratic, so it must have a
cultural sector that is both voluntary and pluralistic. Poets will not
be banned, as Socrates is said to have insisted,94 and books will not
be censored, even though Milton himself once wielded the stamp.
95
But the state, as in modern liberalism, will be free to educate its
citizens in its own values, which they must always be free to
embrace or reject.
The main difference with modern liberalism will be this: The
education of children will not be the state's option; it will be the
state's most basic function. Even as Socrates says in The Republic,
the primary task of the Guardians must be to educate the all of the
Republic's children equally.96
In part, we can now see, this is because both of the Republic's
other two public sectors, the economic and the legal, cannot
function properly unless staffed by professionals who know and
serve the common good. But that is only half the story, because, as
we said at the outset, politics, the norms of the ideal social order, is
fully integrated with ethics, the norms of the ideal individual life.
4. Ethics
For present purposes, the ethics of neo-classical republicanism
is best seen in comparison with the Lockean and modern liberal
alternatives. Like Locke's ethics, the ethics of neo-classical
94. See PLATO, supra note 7, bk. X, at 282, 286.
95. See 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1359 n.4 (M. H. Abrams
ed., 3rd ed. 1974) ("In time, Milton himself became, temporarily, a licenser of news sheets
under Cromwell.").
96. See PLATO, supra note 7, bk. III, at 62, 95 ("Therefore the first and weightiest
command of God to the rulers is this - that more than aught else they be good guardians of
and watch zealously over the offspring .... ").
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republicanism is "structurally" integrated with its politics. In each
system, the goal of politics is to guard the highest individual
ethical value, and, conversely, the limit of the state's power is
interference with that individual value. But, when we examine
what that value is, the difference could hardly be greater: For
Locke, the highest individual good is "negative liberty," freedom as
non-constraint.9 7 From this it follows that the state's primary
function is defensive, protecting each individual's freedom from
other's wrongful interference. For neo-classical republicans, the
ultimate individual value is human excellence, being the best
human being that one can possibly be; from this it follows that the
state's primary function is enabling, creating the conditions under
which the excellence of each citizen can be most thoroughly
realized. Here, on account of this difference, neo-classical
republicanism is able to offer a level of ethical and political
integration that Lockean liberalism cannot match. The highest
individual excellence in the republican system is the willingness
and ability to engage in the governance of the Republic itself (the
"positive liberty" that Isaiah Berlin rather too quickly dismissed).
9 8
This brings us to the most significant implication of neo-
classical republicanism for the fiduciary duties of for-profit
managers. Meeting the full range of their managerial obligations
and being the best individuals they can be comes, ultimately, to
the same thing: being, in their particular sphere, a committed
servant of the common good, a proper Guardian, in their chosen
work, of the Republic itself.
5. Summary
Locke's system subordinates the common good to the individual
good by defining the public good as the protection of individual
rights, from both other individuals and the state. Modern liberal
states subordinate the individual good to the common good by
instituting popular sovereignty, even as modern liberal theorists
try to reconcile the two. Neo-classical republicanism tries to
coordinate the individual good and the public good, Ethics and
Politics, respectively, by making each the complement of the other:
the best person is the one best suited to rule for the good of all; the
best state is the one best suited to produce just such individuals.
Each system, in turn, has a distinctive role for the business
manager, with a distinctive set of duties. For Locke, managers are
97. See PETTIT, supra note 7, at 17-18, 21.
98. See BERLIN, supra note 7, passim.
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the servants of businesses owners, and they, with business owners
themselves, have only a negative duty not to harm. For modern
liberals, managers are still the servants of business but with a
mandate to produce what the people want. For republicans,
managers are, in effect, subagents of the Republic itself, charged
by its politics to produce what is best for its people, even as they
are charged by its ethics to be, themselves, the best people that the
Republic can produce.
III. THE META-ANALYSIS: THE DUTIES OF THE FIDUCIARIES OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY
0 wad some Power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as ithers see us !
-Robert Burns99
This final Part must be short, for we are already on borrowed
time. And it can be short, for reasons its job is to give. We started
out to find the proper fiduciary duties of for-profit managers in a
liberal society; to that end, we examined three ideal-type liberal
societies: Locke's libertarianism, with its minimal duties; modern
liberalism, somewhere in the middle, with duties derived from
modern economic theory; and neo-classical liberalism, with its
maximal duties derived from classical normative theory, both
ethical and political.
We should now, it seems, be ready to choose between them. I
would have to forgive you for thinking that that task will take a
good deal longer, with me in the lead; I hope you will forgive me for
thinking that, with your help, we have pretty much finished it
already. When we put aside Locke's "natural law" system, it was in
large part because it rested on premises that not all of us could
see. When we examined the next alternative, modern liberalism,
we noticed that its premises were stipulated, rather than proved;
its politics a matter of hypothetical, rather than categorical,
imperatives. If you want your economy to satisfy aggregate
consumer satisfaction, have the managers who run your firms and
the officials who regulate them operate on the principles of modern
economic science. Similarly, if you want your legal system to serve
99. ROBERT BURNS, To a Louse, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT
BURNS 43, 44 (W. E Henley & T. F. Henderson eds., Houghton Mifflin Co. Cambridge ed.
1900) (1897) (emphasis added).
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the will of the people, make its liberal principles subject to the
democratic rule.
But, in both cases, economic and political, we saw that, for the
people to have their way, they would be better served by people
who know what they are doing, technocrats who know how to
make the complex machinery of the modern economies and modern
states actually work. If the people want to get what they want, we
noticed, they would do well to do as we say. What we say, it is
worth noting, includes two paradoxical suggestions: Don't do
things merely because others tell you to, or even because you
yourself want to, because the unexamined life leads to big
problems, both personal and social.
But we also noticed-some of us, surely, more reluctantly than
others-that the people sometimes want some pretty terrible
things: bear-baiting in the marketplace, "blood and soil" in the
voting booth (not to pick examples entirely at random). Some of us
do not think we should deny the people their preferences; all of us,
I trust, recognize that we could not, even if we would.
But all of us also recognize that the people will not know better
if we do not teach them, that they will not buy better goods if our
capitalists and our managers do not make and market them. We
might differ on the particular products, even the particular
teachings. But, I think, we do not differ on who the proper teachers
are, or where our managers should go to learn not just what to
make but also how-and not just what to make of the resources
committed to their management but also of their very lives.
CONCLUSION(S): PROPER SOCIALISTS MAKE CAPITALISM'S
BEST MANAGERS (BECAUSE NEO-CLASSICAL
REPUBLICANS MAKE THE BEST LIBERALS)
Our first epigraph, the title of Milton Friedman's famous essay,
offered a decidedly individualistic view of the fiduciary duties of
for-profit managers: The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits. But even there, in that effort to cash out the
common good in terms of private profit, lay the seed of something
very much larger. When we followed Tawney's lead and traced
business's social responsibility back to its social function, we found
a far wider range of options, all well within the meaning of
liberalism. If we, capitalism's ultimate managers, are to make it
great again, we must keep it close to its entrusted task: serving the
common weal as we understand it. Under our watchful eyes,
business's bounties can be everyone's blessings. And not least
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among those blessings will be liberty, the same liberty that Milton
imagined when he was de facto foreign minister for the first
English-speaking Republic:
I imagine myself to have set out upon my travels,
and that I behold from on high tracts beyond the
seas, and wide-extended regions; that I behold
countenances strange and numberless ... from the
columns of Hercules to the farthest borders of India,
that throughout this vast expanse, I am bringing
back, bringing home to every nation, liberty, so long
driven out, so long an exile .... 100
100. JOHN MILTON, THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, AGAINST AN
ANONYMOUS LIBEL (1654), reprinted in 2 THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON; CONTAINING
HIS PRINCIPAL POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL PIECES, WITH NEW TRANSLATIONS, AND AN
INTRODUCTION 328, 333 (George Burnett ed. & trans., London, John Miller 1809).
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